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War College: Book Reviews

BOOK REVIEWS

A NEW DISORDER
Newhouse, John, ed. Assessing the Threats. Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information, 2002.
119pp. $20

It is no cliché to argue that the terrorist
attack that befell the United States in
September 2001 was a climacteric event,
a watershed in the post–Cold War world.
Henceforth, all analyses of American national security policy will demarcate
events as having occurred either before
or after the horrendous events of that
day.
While some issues like national missile
defense, nuclear proliferation, and terrorism predated “9/11,” others arose out
of the rubble of the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon: the threat of sophisticated global terror networks dedicated to
the perpetration of violence against the
United States and its interests; the imminent danger of weapons of mass destruction (especially in the hands of rogue
states or in those of international terrorists like al-Qa‘ida); and the profound,
ongoing debate among America’s national security elites over the pursuit of a
multilateralist foreign policy or one underwritten by unilateralism.
In Assessing the Threats, each of these issues is addressed with varying degrees of
emphasis by a group of international
scholars. The book was conceived as an
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effort to examine threats to security and
stability cross-nationally. The quality of
the research conducted by each of the
contributors, and the timeliness of their
inquiries make this work a valuable resource
for readers of the Naval War College Review.
John Newhouse is an experienced strategic
policy analyst who is currently a senior fellow at the Center for Defense Information,
under the auspices of which the present
work was undertaken.
Newhouse plants himself firmly in the
multilateralist camp, in an article with
the same title as the book: “Nothing less
than sustained multilateralism will enable
major powers to neutralize the interactive problems of terrorism and weapons
of mass destruction.” In another salient
observation, Newhouse contends that
“Russia’s warning system against submarine missile attack, designed around a
new generation of satellites, is still inoperable.” In this assertion, Newhouse has
confirmed that Russia has no credible
defense from fleet ballistic missile submarines of the Trident II type, armed
with D-5 missiles.
Such asymmetries between the strategic
and financial capabilities of the United
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States and Russia are confirmed by
Alexei Arbatov, the veteran Russian analyst of American institutions and foreign policy. In his “Russian Security
and the Western Connection,” Arbatov
describes the destabilizing effect the
American abrogation of the ABM
Treaty would have upon Russia’s conventional forces. They would be degraded to the point where they would
be “hardly sufficient for even one local
contingency and several peacekeeping
operations.” Like Newhouse, Arbatov is
particularly critical of the present
American foreign policy, arguing that
the “quality and wisdom” of its design
is no longer commensurate with the financial and military power of the
United States.

current perceived U.S. penchant for a
triumphalist unilateralism, Delpech
would echo Aeschylus in Prometheus
Bound and envelop or constrain Pax
Americana with the bonds of
multilateralism.
I was struck by the book’s lack of a
comprehensive introduction or concluding chapter to sum up and assess
the future in a meaningful way. Instead,
the reader is left with several conclusions, which detracts from a sense of
cohesion about the book’s contents.
Nevertheless, each individual contribution has something of value to offer,
and taken in that context, each is significant to our understanding of the power
calculus at work today.
MYRON A. GREENBERG

Similarly, Ivan Safranchuk has presented an equally fascinating tour
d’horizon in his analysis of “An Array of
Threats to Russia.” Safranchuk effectively entombs the Cold War with the
argument that today Russia’s primary
strategic posture is defensive. This
point is demonstrated by his assertion
of Russian action. Surrounded by
pariah regimes such as exist in Iraq and
Iran and possessing the potential for
deploying weapons of mass destruction,
Russia, Safranchuk argues, now accepts
penetration of its Central Asian and
Caucasus borderlands by the United
States. This is a theme worth exploring.
Thérèse Delpech’s query with reference
to “A Safe and Secure Europe?” echoes
British foreign secretary Douglas
Hurd’s contrapuntal prediction of a decade ago of “a new disorder,” against
former President Bush’s proclamation
of a “New World Order.” Delpech portrays the “9/11” attacks as events
“which gave asymmetric warfare a horrific shape.” In order to “tame” the
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Defense Contract Management Agency, Dayton

O’Hanlon, Michael E. Defense Policy Choices
for the Bush Administration. Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press, 2001. 244pp. $18.95

O’Hanlon presents his blueprint for
how U.S. resources should be spent
based on thorough strategic and military assessments. He recommends that
the Bush administration set priorities
and make the difficult choices. However, the terrorist attacks of “9/11” and
the completion of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) have
changed fiscal conditions and defense
strategy.
O’Hanlon is a senior fellow in foreign
policy studies at the Brookings Institution. He is the author of numerous
books and articles on U.S. defense strategy, with special emphasis on defense
budgets and military technology. His
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comprehensive analysis and extensive
footnotes not only demonstrate his
deep knowledge of the subject but also
reinforce the complexity of strategic
and force planning decisions.
The book addresses “two major theaters
for war,” defense strategy, military
readiness and modernization, overseas
troop commitments, homeland defense,
national missile defense, offensive nuclear forces, and U.S. force planning
implications if the United States assists
Taiwan in defeating a hypothetical Chinese blockade. Each chapter describes
and assesses the strategic environment,
then offers comprehensive suggestions
for modifying the 2001–2005 resource
allocations.
A central theme throughout this work
is that the defense budget is unlikely to
make substantial gains and that the
Bush administration must balance
competing defense requirements. Even
with the large plus-up in the fiscal year
2002 defense budget, the military is still
fiscally constrained due to the demands
of the “procurement holiday” (the period after the Reagan administration’s
massive military buildup in which adequate funds were not provided to modernize existing weapons—without the
constant increase of new modern weapons, the need to replace old equipment
is exacerbated) and the war on terrorism. Overall, O’Hanlon believes in buying more existing weapons than
developing expensive next-generation
weapons. The author states that the
1997 QDR’s plan for modernization is
excessive. Rather than rush to transform most weapons, O’Hanlon recommends taking a patient, balanced
approach, such as buying less advanced
hardware for the large, main weapon
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systems while “aggressively modernizing electronics, munitions, sensors, and
communications systems,” giving a
higher priority to research and development and joint experimentation. For
example, he recommends that the Navy
cancel its variant of the Joint Strike
Fighter, purchase the 1997 QDRproposed quantity of F/A-18E/F Super
Hornet, and procure additional F/A18C/Ds to meet fighter aircraft force
structure requirements. O’Hanlon estimates this mixture of planes would
“save more than $5 billion over the next
decade.” Using the same philosophy,
O’Hanlon suggests that the Air Force
reduce the procurement quantity of
Joint Strike Fighters from 1,700 to five
hundred and purchase 1,200 more F-16
aircraft. The savings from these changes
could fund new technologies to make
the military more deployable and
lighter, as well as “small numbers of
next-generation major weaponry as ‘silver bullet’ forces.”
In another chapter, O’Hanlon recommends reducing the operational tempo
by dropping overseas troop commitments, stating that a service member is
“away from home at least 15–20% of
the time,” due mostly to deployments
and training. According to the author,
250,000 service members are either
based or deployed overseas. O’Hanlon
advocates maintaining a U.S. presence
in regions with key strategic interests
and scaling back in other regions. For
example, the number of Marines on
Okinawa should be reduced from
eighteen thousand to approximately
five thousand, because the deployment is
“not militarily or strategically essential—
and . . . is on balance harmful to the
U.S.-Japanese alliance.” As a substitute
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for personnel, he recommends positioning additional equipment on the
island in case of a regional crisis. Secondly, O’Hanlon proposes that the
Navy take another look at its full-time
presence in the Mediterranean. He believes that “NATO’s southern flank and
Israel’s western flank no longer constitute strategic vulnerabilities in the
post–Cold War era.” If a threat no longer exists, eliminate carrier deployments that are carried out only to
reassure allies and give “psychological
comfort.” Reducing unnecessary deployments, shifting bases closer to contested regions, and rotating crews to the
ship instead of returning the ship to
port will decrease the operational
tempo of the sailors, eliminate the need
for two carriers, and generate savings.
The recommendations made in this
work in early 2001 could have given the
Bush administration some policy options and provided alternatives for the
2001 QDR. However, many of
O’Hanlon’s arguments have been overtaken by world events. Nevertheless,
O’Hanlon’s exhaustive research and insightful analysis make this an interesting book for readers of strategy and
force-planning decision making.
CYNTHIA PERROTTI

Lieutenant Colonel
Naval War College

Khalilzad, Zalmay, et al. The United States and
Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001. 260pp.
$20

The United States and Asia presents a
cogent analysis of U.S. strategic planning in Asia, sweeping from Japan to
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Pakistan. The study’s specific focus is
development of policy options and recommendations, looking out at an approximate twenty-year horizon into the
future, especially analyzing and noting
implications for Air Force planning. A
result of Project AIR FORCE’S work on
future asian security, this book was prepared by a team of RAND specialists,
with the help of senior U.S. Air Force
leadership, and with editorial comment
by U.S. foreign policy officials. It benefits from the strengths of the team approach without the flaws of design by
committee. It succinctly presents the
thoughts and findings of the research
group in clear, thought-provoking
prose and figures.
The brief introduction stresses the need
to prevent latent rivalries in Asia from
upsetting the twenty years of relative
peace between 1980 and 2000. The
challenge for the United States is to develop policies that will continue to promote a stable Asia compatible with U.S.
interests—in short, to succeed in a
quest for “dynamic peace.”
The scene is set with a discussion of the
range of international trends and problems in Asia, including possible Korean
unification, the U.S.-Japan relationship,
China’s emerging profile, India’s ambitions, Pakistan’s difficulties, Russia’s future, disputes in the South China Sea,
stresses on Indonesia, and Vietnam’s
significance. Although necessarily a
whirlwind tour and not for country
specialists, these are short, basically fair
synopses. Additionally, the book includes four longer appendices by area
specialists that add considerable detail
to the earlier descriptions of changing
political-military environments in
Northeast Asia, China, Southeast Asia,
and South Asia.
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Although the book discusses terrorism
and Islamic fundamentalism, the events
of the past year argue for more analysis
of these topics in any strategic discussion, especially as they relate to South,
Central, and Southeast Asia.
In the strategy section, key U.S. objectives in Asia are defined as continued
economic, political, and military access,
and the prevention of the rise of a regional power or coalition that would
prevent access to the region. Discussed
strategic options for achieving these objectives include strengthening U.S. hegemony, forming a “condominium”
with one of Asia’s major powers, acting
as a “balance” in a multipolar regional
power system, creating a comprehensive collective security system, and U.S.
disengagement. Each approach discussed is discarded as either too
expensive, too fraught with domestic
problems, too subordinate, or too ineffectual historically. The study then recommends a strategic approach that is
flexible and pragmatic, involving elements of most of these strategic options. Bilateral relationships should
push toward multilateralization, creating a larger core partnership including
the United States, Japan, South Korea,
Australia, and perhaps Singapore, the
Philippines, and Thailand. At the same
time it advocates a balance-of-power
strategy among the rising powers of
China, India, and Russia that will prevent these states from either threatening each other or “bandwagoning” to
undercut U.S. interests. It encourages
promotion of a security dialog among
all the states of Asia and encourages
others to enter the U.S.-led multilateral
framework. It suggests maintaining flexible relations with as many countries as
possible to support the formation of ad
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hoc coalitions to deal with emerging regional problems. The study goes on to
outline more than a dozen ways this
strategy could be adapted to implement
U.S. policies in Asia.
In the military section, observations are
made about U.S. force structure in Asia,
with some suggestions for reconfiguring
military presence given anticipated
changes in the Asian environment. The
study predicts that North Korea may
not require that all U.S. military forces
leave South Korea if and when Korea
unifies, so it suggests the option of
maintaining one of the two main operating air bases in Korea. The study also
recommends expanding base facilities
on Guam. Beyond that, it recommends
making arrangements to use existing
bases in Asia, both U.S. and foreign,
through diplomatic means. In this way,
the United States would remain neither
overcommitted nor undercommitted.
This section is enhanced by the inclusion of a series of schematic maps and
tables that identify and assess U.S. air
bases in Asia. The maps are especially
useful in assessing U.S. Air Force capabilities for crisis response in Korea, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and South Asia.
An important recommendation is made
to improve the U.S. Unified Command
Plan either by including Pakistan under
the Pacific Command, as India is, or by
establishing a coordinating committee
for daily communication.
Concluding military recommendations
are for buildup of Guam as a major hub
for U.S. power projection in Asia, cooperation of the U.S. Air Force and the
Navy to maximize joint leverage, and
review of the Air Force future force
structure, looking toward longer-range
combat platforms, including heavy
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bombers, arsenal planes, and longrange, high-speed strike craft.
Concluding strategic recommendations
include maintaining open lines of communication with as many parties in
Asia as possible, maintaining U.S.
transparency so that U.S. objectives are
clearly understood, and expanding the
net of U.S. security partners.
This RAND outline of a comprehensive, realistic, flexible U.S. strategy in
Asia, with appropriate military reconfiguration, is an important contribution
to our search for continued stability in
this part of the world.
GRANT F. RHODE

Brookline, Massachusetts

Pollack, Kenneth M. The Threatening Storm: The
Case for Invading Iraq. New York: Random
House, 2002. 384pp. $25.95

The United States and its allies once
more stand on the brink of war with
Iraq. What makes this war different,
however, is that its primary goal is to
replace the dictatorial regime of
Saddam Hussein with a democratic
form of government. In the opinion of
the Bush administration, removal of
Saddam and his weapons of mass destruction will bring stability to the Middle East and the world. While there is
consensus to remove Saddam and destroy his weapons, there is disagreement among the experts as to how to
accomplish it. Kenneth Pollack is a specialist on Iraq whose experience as an
analyst for the Central Intelligence
Agency and the National Security
Council gives him a unique vantage
point from which to comment on U.S.
foreign policy in the Middle East. In
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The Threatening Storm, Pollack posits
that a U.S.-led invasion of Iraq is the
only logical means to end Saddam’s regime. This argument results from a
thorough discussion of the rise of the
current regime and of Iraq’s relationships with its neighbors and the West,
followed by a painstaking analysis of
the several options available.
In the case of Iraq, says Pollack, our vital national interest, as well as that of
the entire world, clearly lies in the economic stability of the region based on
ability to export crude oil without interference. Following the Gulf War of
1990–91, the United Nations implemented a number of measures to contain Iraqi ambitions. A short time later,
teams of weapons experts entered the
country to locate and destroy chemical
and biological weapons stockpiles and
production facilities. In 1998 Iraq threw
out the inspection teams, and for the
past four years, notes Pollack, the Iraqis
have allegedly been reacquiring chemical and biological weapons and have
reenergized their research programs to
develop nuclear weapons. Some world
leaders and strategists have proposed
five options for dealing with what they
claim is a clear and present danger to
their vital national interest in the Persian Gulf. These options are containment, deterrence, covert action, the
“Afghan” approach, and invasion.
Containment has been the policy since
the end of the Gulf War. Originally, it
had two key components: weapons inspections and economic sanctions.
With the eviction of the weapons inspectors, economic sanctions became
the sole functioning component of the
policy. The oil-for-food program and
smuggling, as well as reluctance on the
part of some allies, notably France and
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Russia, to abide by the terms of the
United Nations resolutions have served
to undermine the sanctions effort. Consequently, Saddam has been able to
acquire continuing funding for his
weapons of mass destruction programs.
Pollack maintains, therefore, that neither reimplementation of sanctions nor
unilateral imposition of sanctions by
the United States will work, because
they either do not have meaningful support from the international community
or will place the United States in conflict with its allies. In addition, sanctions would not be the most effective
way of quickly overthrowing Saddam’s
regime.
If the United States accepts the view
that Iraq should occupy a lower priority
in American policy, says Pollack, it
must choose a policy of deterrence. Pollack explains that deterrence relies on
the threat of American military action
against Iraq to ensure regional stability,
which assumes that the one deterred is
concerned about the consequences of
continuing to act uncooperatively. In
Saddam’s case, that is not a part of his
psychological profile. Pollack, therefore, rules out deterrence as a viable option, because it would leave Saddam
“free to acquire nuclear weapons” and
would be a hope against the odds that
American use of power would be sufficient to keep him in his pen. This scenario, says Pollack, is very risky and
very dangerous.
The United States has tried covert actions before with little success. Covert
actions, such as assassinations and
coups, are extremely complicated operations, and the risk of failure is high.
However, short of actually removing
Saddam from power, covert actions can
set the stage in terms of intelligence
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gathering, communications, and liaison
work for a successful change in government. However, this approach, though
useful, would also not meet the stated
objective of quickly overthrowing
Saddam’s regime.
The fourth option, the “Afghan approach,” limits the use of force to special operations troops and precision
aerial bombing. In addition, there is the
issue of using opposition forces to
accomplish the overthrow and reestablishment of government. Unfortunately,
Iraq’s opposition forces are much
weaker than, and not as well organized
as, those in Afghanistan. This option
too represents a lengthy engagement
without guarantee of success.
Each of these four options has loopholes that could leave Saddam Hussein
in power. Pollack believes that the only
real solution is an invasion of Iraq by
conventional ground and air forces.
Pollack argues his case well, going beyond the vituperative pronouncements
of the administration to link operational objectives to national strategy,
but he does not spend much time on
the reconstruction of the country,
which is, after all, the reason for invasion in the first place. He does make
two noteworthy points, however: the
removal of Saddam would allow for
withdrawal of most of U.S. forces in the
Persian Gulf region; and second, with
its wealth in oil, Iraq can pay for its
own reconstruction. Naturally, there
are advantages and disadvantages to
each option, and critics abound, but for
Pollack the question is “not whether
[we invade], but when.”
Public opinion polls may show general
support for a war in Iraq, but many
people remain doubtful of the need for
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war or for U.S. involvement. Though
this book is out to sell a policy option,
Pollack’s detailed analyses provide
readers with an excellent basis for understanding the situation in the Middle
East.
PRESTON C. RODRIGUE

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Cohen, Eliot A. Supreme Command: Soldiers,
Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime. New York:
Free Press, 2002. 288pp. $25

This is an extraordinarily timely work,
published when the United States may
be about to conduct large-scale combat
operations in the Middle East. It examines the relationship in a democracy between military and political leadership,
“or more precisely, . . . the tension between two kinds of leadership, civil and
military,” especially in time of war.
Two themes run implicitly throughout
the book. First, war is about more than
purely military considerations (Clausewitzians, rejoice!), and consequently
“war statesmanship . . . focuses at the
apex of government an array of considerations and calculations that even
those one rung down could not fully
fathom.” The resultant differing imperatives at each level explain much of the
inherent tension between civilian and
military leaders over strategy.
Second, the essence of successful wartime leadership depends crucially on
the civilian leadership’s receiving constant, reliable “truth” from its military
commanders. The hierarchical military
structure militates against delivery of
harsh facts or unpleasant news; as per
Winston Churchill, “the whole habit of
mind of a military staff is based on
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subordination of opinion.” Hence the
importance of civilian leaders constantly
asking questions, forcing military leaders
to lay bare their assumptions and explain their reasoning, because nothing
else will force the harsh but vital intellectual debate about whether military
plans actually will achieve the desired
strategic ends. Military expertise is not
decisive here; as David Ben-Gurion
noted, “In military matters, as in all
other matters of substance, experts
knowledgeable in technique don’t decide, even though their advice and
guidance is vital; rather an open mind
and a common sense are essential. And
these qualities are possessed—to a
greater or lesser degree— by any normal man.”
Citing Samuel Huntington’s classic The
Soldier and the State, Cohen describes
the “normal” theory of civil-military
relations, “which holds that the healthiest and most effective form of civilian
control of the military is that which
maximizes professionalism by isolating
soldiers from politics, and giving them
as free a hand as possible in military
matters.” This idea is widely and often
unquestioningly accepted by serving
military officers, reinforced by the apparent lessons of Vietnam, when such
tenets were held to be violated, in contrast with the successes of DESERT
STORM, when the military was ostensibly properly left alone to win the war.
Indeed, for civilians to “ask too many
questions (let alone give orders) about
tactics, particular pieces of hardware,
the design of a campaign, measures of
success, or to press too closely for the
promotion or dismissal of anything
other than the most senior officers is
meddling and interference, which is inappropriate and downright dangerous.”
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Cohen suggests that this is simply
wrong. “The difficulty is that the great
war statesmen do just those improper
things—and, what is more, it is because
they do so that they succeed.” He tests
his thesis using case studies of four
great and successful war leaders—Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau,
Churchill, and Ben-Gurion. Each man
led a different kind of democracy under
extraordinarily difficult circumstances,
“meddled” greatly in military and strategic affairs, was subject to and driven
by the normal pressures and constraints
in his respective state, confronted great
changes in the ways and means of conducting warfare, and had difficult relationships with his senior military
leaders.
In none of these cases was there a fundamental doubt about the subordination of military leaders to civilian
control. However, the acceptance of the
legitimacy of that control coexisted,
and still coexists, with “a deep undercurrent of mutual mistrust,” based on
major differences in outlook, experience, temperament, and culture. Such
differences are exacerbated in wartime,
because unlike other professions such
as law and medicine, a military leader
rarely has actual war-making experience at senior levels, so in a sense he is
no less a “novice in making the great
decisions of war” than his civilian
counterparts. Thus, while “for a politician to dictate military action is almost
always folly,” as Churchill noted, “it is
always right to probe.” That is the common element in these cases—each
leader insisted on close and frequent
contact with his senior military officers,
often to their discomfiture and resentment. Lincoln wrote probing letters to
his generals and “exercised a constant
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oversight of the war effort from beginning to end.” Clemenceau, to the dismay of the French high command,
insisted on frequent firsthand visits to
the front lines to observe the performance of senior military leaders and
review the selection of generals down to
division command. Churchill’s queries
and interventions were legion.
Cohen notes that the United States has,
for the past four decades, essentially
“waged war according to the ‘normal’
theory of civil-military relations,”
whereby politicians “refrain from engaging in the kind of active, harassing,
interventionist probing of the military
leaders about military matters” that
characterized his four great leaders,
contrary to the received (but wrong)
wisdom in the U.S. military. In consequence, “loose assumptions, unasked
questions, and thin analysis” led to catastrophic failure in Vietnam.
More recently, the Goldwater-Nichols
Act, by making the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs the president’s chief military adviser, serves to separate further
the civilian and military leadership
realms. One of the baleful consequences
of “letting the military do their jobs,”
essentially independently of the political leadership once the shooting started,
was the premature end to DESERT
STORM, in which the military was chiefly
responsible for two critical decisions—
General Colin Powell recommended an
early end to the fighting, and General
Norman Schwarzkopf made concessions at Safwan that allowed Saddam
Hussein to survive internal revolts that
might have ended his regime. Missing
in both decisions was clear civilian
control of events. There is little indication of civilian leadership asking the
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necessary probing questions and providing key guidance.
These issues are especially salient now,
as the United States contemplates undertaking military operations that
would have profound strategic and political implications, and when indications of significant differences exist
between civilian and military leaders
concerning strategy and objectives, be it
against terrorism or militant Islam.
Eliot Cohen is professor of strategic
studies at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. A prolific author on strategy, he
has served on the Office of the Secretary
of Defense policy planning staff and is
currently a member of the Defense Policy Board, advising the secretary of defense. Supreme Command is a must read
for the highest civilian and military
leadership and should also rank high on
military professional reading lists.
JAN VAN TOL

Captain, U.S. Navy

Bacevich, Andrew J., and Eliot A. Cohen, eds.
War over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global
Age. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2001.
223pp. $22.50

During the 1999 Nato-U.S. war against
Serbia over Kosovo, an unprecedented
number of strategic and defense thinkers published their opinions on what
became known as Operation ALLIED
FORCE. Most thought and comment at
the time was extremely critical of the
Clinton administration’s efforts to formulate and execute the operation.
Critics bemoaned a warfighting policy
that appeared pointed in the direction
of a new Vietnam, focusing on gradual
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escalation of air strikes without the
threat of ground forces. In the end, the
Nato coalition forces appeared victorious but weighted with the indefinite
mission of peacekeeping in that troubled and violent province. The leader of
the Serbian effort, Slobodan Milosevic,
ended up on trial for war crimes at the
Hague. The leader of the Nato-U.S.
armed forces, General Wesley Clarke,
left his post shortly after the victory under circumstances that looked at the
time like a relief for cause. In late summer 2002, Nato soldiers continued their
frustrating mission of keeping ethnically divided Kosovars from killing each
other—welcome to “Victory,” post–
Cold War style. While such behavior
and commentary seem unusual, the real
issue is this: does the 1999 Kosovo
“war” provide a signpost for future
conflicts in the early twenty-first century, or is that conflict an aberration
best relegated to discussions among
armchair warriors comfortably fortified
with vintage brandy?
In their book War over Kosovo, Bacevich, Cohen, and their contributors
make compelling arguments that the
Kosovo War is a signpost, a cautionary
tale of the extent and limits of post–
Cold War superpower politics. Besides
the articles by the editors, the contributions are by William Arkin, James
Kurth, Anatol Lieven, Alberto Coll, and
Michael Vickers.
Readers should note well that this is a
book with an attitude. Its articles, uniformly excellent and insightful, accept,
even embrace, controversy. Given the
nature of the war, such a position for
the book should seem normal.
William Arkin’s lead article, summarizing the history of the conflict, should
become the standard for historians and
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strategists seeking to understand the
war in some form less than book size.
Arkin advises readers not to be deceived
by appearances or Powerpoint briefings
on just what decided victory for the
Nato allies. The article certainly should
replace the disingenuous official
Kosovo report by the secretary of defense used in the curriculum of the
Naval War College and other service
schools.
However, the Arkin piece is only the
appetizer. There is insufficient room to
highlight all the fine articles in this review, but two struck this reviewer between the eyes. In the first, Anatol
Lieven warns American “hawks” not to
believe Kosovo is a model for future
wars but that the conflict “will persuade
. . . adversaries to confront the West indirectly, using nonstate actors.” This
was written before 11 September 2002.
Lieven points out that the chaotic, decentralized, and violent nature of likely
future conflict environments, including
Afghanistan, can negate the hightechnology advantages of the West,
forcing the fighting down to earth on
conditions more to the liking of the enemy. Reading Lieven, and then watching General Tommy Franks tell U.S.
troops in Afghanistan that the war will
be a long one, made this reviewer’s
hands cold and sweaty. In the second
article, Andrew Bacevich conducts a revisionist tour de force describing the
evolution of the Clausewitzian “remarkable trinity” as it applies to the
United States, focusing especially on the
latest changes effected by the Clinton
administration and first demonstrated
in Kosovo. At the risk of simplification,
Bacevich would have the current trinity
composed of a globally involved government able to use a professional, not
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conscript, armed force wherever it
wants in face of an uninterested public—
as long as the conflict is quick and
bloodless. Whether or not one agrees
with Bacevich’s premise and findings,
the power and flow of the author’s conceptualization is truly impressive.
This is a necessary book for those who
teach and practice national security.
The writing and thinking are deep and
compelling. One must congratulate the
editors for their selections. One also
must hope that defense decision makers, as well as students who will form
the next generation of leadership, will
read and pay serious attention to the
works in this book.
JON CZARNECKI

Associate Professor of Joint Maritime Operations
Naval War College, Monterey Program

Locher, James R., III. Victory on the Potomac.
College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 2002.
507pp. $34.95

Jim Locher describes the history of the
intense bureaucratic struggle to redesign relationships between the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, secretary of defense, the president, and Congress. The prolonged
struggle culminated in the GoldwaterNichols Act of 1986. This document is
thought by many to be the most sweeping military reform of the last forty
years. Senators Barry Goldwater and
Sam Nunn believed the system was broken and consequently was providing
low-quality military advice to the
secretary of defense. Others, particularly the service chiefs and the secretary
of defense, strongly disagreed with this
assessment. Victory on the Potomac
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represents a dramatic, detailed, and
sometimes entertaining description of
the prolonged hardball political maneuvering and bureaucratic infighting between those for and those against
reform. Locher colorfully describes the
tactics and personalities of the key figures involved in the debate. He begins
with the long and difficult history of efforts made during the Harry Truman
and Dwight Eisenhower era to reform the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and to strengthen the
role of its chairman. Locher then focuses on Senator Goldwater, Senator
Nunn, Representative Ike Skelton, Representative Bill Nichols, and key staffs’
detailed strategy for reform. Their efforts led to bitter confrontations with
senior military and civilian leaders who
held the view that proposed legislation
would cripple the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s
influence. Of particular interest is Secretary of the Navy John Lehman’s total
opposition to the legislative proposals
and his tactics to outflank the legislators and, indeed, at times to outflank
his own boss, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger. Locher also describes
the particular difficulties for senior military officers favoring reform. Individuals like Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.,
exhibited the utmost delicacy in balancing personal beliefs with the Pentagon’s
antireform stand.
Although the book emphasizes the
Goldwater-Nichols struggle, it is a textbook on the complexities and strategies
of bureaucratic politics fought for high
stakes between the legislative and executive branches. Emotion, parochialism,
and legitimate beliefs conflict and, at
times, become highly personal. Students of government politics will find
that the book adds generously to insights on the dynamics of gaining
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support for, or fighting against, significant legislative proposals. Readers with
serious interest in national security policy formulation will benefit from the
detailed examination of how arguments
are developed, coalitions are constructed, and past history (such as Lebanon and Grenada) is marshaled to
support either side of a debate. Those
who favored reform will marvel at the
persistence and political skill of the advocates. Those opposed will, no doubt,
regard many of the described political
tactics as unfair and perhaps unethical.
In an excellent epilogue, Locher reiterates the original purposes for the legislation and uses them to evaluate the
present success of the GoldwaterNichols Act provisions. His analysis has
balance and notes that the behaviorial
changes sought have not been fully realized, but he does conclude that the legislation “made significant and positive
contributions in improving the quality
of military advice.” Locher observes
that this judgment is shared by principal customers of the Joint Staff and by
senior Joint Staff practitioners. Those
who believe that significant improvement has resulted include former
secretary of defense Dick Cheney,
Colin Powell, and General John M.
Shalikashvilli. In a separate book of his
own, Admiral Crowe, the first chairman
under Goldwater-Nichols, noted that
the increased authority of the chairman
was a significant benefit and not overly
contested by the heads of service. Increasing the authority of the regional
commanders was thought to add much
to their capability for fulfilling warfighting roles. General Powell added
that the Joint Staff had “improved so
dramatically [that] it had become the
premier military staff in the world.”

12

War College: Book Reviews
BOOK REVIEWS

The epilogue also examines disappointments, including the observation that
“the Pentagon still lacks a vision of its
needs for Joint officers and how to prepare and reward them.”
Locher is a graduate of West Point and
the Harvard Business School. He was a
leading Goldwater-Nichols strategist on
the staff of the Senate Committee on
Armed Services. He is the authority on
the detailed political pulls and tugs that
brought Goldwater-Nichols into existence. While Locher strives for a balanced analysis, his commitment to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff reform and his own
key role in that process result in a more
detailed examination of the proponents’
view while giving less detail to the arguments of the opponents. Some of the
opponents he classifies as excessively parochial, while others are characterized as
ignoring obvious system flaws.
Goldwater-Nichols has had an unquestioned major effect on the Joint Staff
process and on officer education. It is
and will be for many years, the subject
of intensive debate and analysis.
Locher’s book will be an important reference in this debate (and in turn, his
article “Has It Worked? The GoldwaterNichols Reorganization Act,” in the
Autumn 2001 issue of this journal, is a
good introduction to it). I strongly recommend that anyone interested or involved in the national security process
read this book. It describes democracy
at work and just how hard that process
can be.
WILLIAM TURCOTTE

Professor Emeritus
Naval War College
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Shachtman, Tom. Terrors and Marvels: How Science and Technology Changed the Character and
Outcome of World War II. New York: William
Morrow, 2002. 360pp. $26.95

Tom Schachtman’s brief history of the
influence of science and technology on
World War II needs less “gee whiz” and
more John McPhee. As in the war itself,
the author’s strategic decisions are critical to the book’s successes and failures.
The successes can be quickly acknowledged. The book is well written.
Shachtman shows a good familiarity
with the oral histories and memoirs of
the most prominent scientists. He is interesting when identifying personalities
and providing biographical material to
enliven the narrative. He also correctly
treats most of the significant scientifictechnical developments of the war: the
exploitation of the electromagnetic
spectrum for command and control,
navigation, and target acquisition;
guidance systems for such ordnance as
acoustic torpedoes and proximity-fused
shells; nuclear weapons; signals intelligence; jet propulsion; and chemical and
biological warfare.
Now I’ll drop the other cyclotron. Terrors and Marvels does too little with too
much, and it suffers from Shachtman’s
attempt to be international and chronological. Except for the fact that somehow the Allies “did better science” than
the Axis (all those refugees from Nazism certainly helped), the author offers
little explanation of how all these Allied
wonder weapons, crypto dominance,
and radar-sonar devices came about. If
Shachtman had written separate chapters on his prize weapons, one would be
far the wiser about the scientific and
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political dimensions of technological
innovation. He is blissfully ignorant of
a decade of writing about the process of
military-technical innovation in the
twentieth century. The book has no
compelling theme or interpretive core.
Although this reviewer usually grimaces
when graduate students invoke such deities as Thomas S. Kuhn and Michel
Foucault, this book would have benefited from more theoretical structure.
Terrors and Marvels might also have
profited from more attention to innovations that did not involve the gallant
struggles of Nobel laureates in physics
and chemistry to convince knownothing politicians and generals to
adopt their latest schemes to win the war.
Storytelling conquers all. From the perspective of military logisticians and
commanders, innovations in food processing, materials research, automotive
engineering, computer technology, synthetics, and chemical explosives were
war winners too. Schachtman gives
them all short shrift. His discussion on
preventive medicine and the treatment
of combat trauma wounds is particularly limited, given the rich multivolume official histories of the U.S.
armed forces medical establishments in
World War II.
Part of Schachtman’s difficulty is that
he really does not know much about
World War II, apparently alternating
carelessly between the books of Martin
Gilbert and Richard Overy—who, of
course, are blameless for his series of
gaffes. A few samples should suffice:
Ishii Shiro’s final rank was lieutenant
general, not major (p. 318); Iwo Jima
was prized as a fighter base and emergency landing site, not a B-29 base
(p. 298); Japanese troops did not land on
Bataan in December 1941, and they did
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not seize “American garrisons at Shanghai and Tientsin,” since the 4th Marines
and 15th Infantry had already departed
(p. 166); the 17 August 1943 Eighth Air
Force raid on “Schweinefurt” [sic] was
made by 230 B-17s, not 376, and German flak accounted for only six bombers
from the 1st Bombardment Wing, which
lost thirty B-17s to German fighters. In
fact, the entire first paragraph of chapter
7 is riddled with fiction. The sparse
account of Allied military medicine ignores a central fact and accomplishment—wounded survival rates were
important but not as important as the
number of American wounded who
returned to a duty status of some sort.
The number of wounded combatants
who lived to fight another day is dramatized in the story of Company E,
506th Parachute Infantry Regiment,
immortalized in word and videotape by
historian Stephen Ambrose. Another
slip is Shachtman’s sketchy account of
the role of operations research and
analysis mathematics; it ignores a massive literature on operations research in
air warfare, logistics, and antisubmarine
warfare—a literature that Shachtman
apparently does not know.
In sum, a single volume on the influence of scientific and technological innovation on World War II would be
welcome. Terrors and Marvels is not
that book.
ALLAN R. MILLETT

Ohio State University

Norris, Robert S. Racing for the Bomb: General
Leslie Groves, the Manhattan Project’s Indispensable Man. South Royalton, Vt.: Steerforth Press,
2002. 722pp. $40
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Today, when a major weapons system
commonly takes decades or more to develop, it is hard to imagine that the
greatest weapon system of them all, the
Manhattan Project, took just three
years from start to detonation over Japan. Those three years were the stuff of
high technical and engineering drama:
vast new industrial facilities were constructed in secret across the United
States, two billion dollars were spent
without congressional oversight, new
scientific laboratories were secluded in
the high desert, and a unique U.S.
Army Air Forces B-29 unit was created.
All this took place under the direct
command of Major General Leslie
Groves, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
whose management style set a norm for
large systems-development programs
that persists today.
In the popular recollection of the
Manhattan Project, the physicists Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, Leo
Szilard, Edward Teller, and the Los
Alamos Laboratory dominate. They are
attractive figures who have remained in
the public eye. Yet Groves, never a popular or sympathetic personality, was the
man who put it all together. As such, he
is worthy of serious attention.
Robert Norris, research associate with
the Natural Resources Defense Council
and scholar of nuclear issues, has written a long-overdue biography of General Groves. While the central theme of
this work is Groves’s leadership of the
Manhattan Project, Norris does a thorough job of integrating into the story
his formative years, family, Army career
prior to the project, and postwar role in
establishing a national policy for atomic
weapons.
The sheer audacity and scope of the
Manhattan Project remain impressive
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today. Based on theory and some critical experiments at the University of
Chicago in the late 1930s and bolstered
by a letter from Albert Einstein to President Franklin Roosevelt, the United
States in 1942 committed itself to building an atomic bomb.
Groves, who had had a distinguished
career as an Army engineer and had
been the overseer of the building of the
Pentagon, was selected to head the
Manhattan Project in August 1942.
Within just a few months, Groves
brought together some of the best engineering officers in the Army, initiated
vast land acquisitions for several large
industrial operations for the purpose of
isotope separation, established the basic
technical compartmentalization policies
that shaped the entire project, and
brought into the program a number of
prominent industrial corporations to
build and run the plants. As the project
grew, Groves fought for and won the
highest priority for critical materials
within the government’s wartime allocation scheme, cornered the world market for uranium ore, set up the Los
Alamos Laboratory, and appointed
Oppenheimer as director.
Groves was a technically shrewd and
aggressive man with complete confidence in his own judgment and willingness to take enormous technical and
industrial risks with untried processes.
His most remarkable talent was the
ability to oversee and pursue alternative
technical development lines until one
or another was proven successful. In
two important cases he made such
high-risk decisions—isotope separation
and bomb design.
Separation of uranium isotopes on an
industrial scale was a critical step in the
bomb manufacture. At the time, there
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seemed to be three competing methods:
gaseous diffusion, thermal separation,
and electromagnetic separation. Each
method had its advocates and its virtues. None was proven. While the scientific community dithered over the
best technical method, Groves charged
in and, with real managerial brass, initiated simultaneous and parallel development of all three separation methods,
making the largest bet on the gaseousdiffusion method at Oak Ridge.
As the engineering worked out, using
the partially enriched product from the
thermal and the electromagnetic separation processes as feedstock for gaseous diffusion gave accelerated results,
and the enriched uranium was ready on
time for the bomb.
Initially, there were two quite different
design approaches to building the
bomb. The most obvious was the gun
assembly technique, in which two
subcritical masses of enriched uranium
were explosively driven and held together until nuclear fission began and
was sustained. This design became the
“Little Boy” bomb that was dropped on
Hiroshima in the world’s first atomic
attack.
However, theory held that the use of
plutonium would produce a far more
efficient means of nuclear detonation.
Plutonium is an artificial element, bred
in a uranium-fueled reactor that is
formed into a hollow sphere and
implosively crushed with high explosives until a nuclear detonation occurs.
This proved to be a demanding technical problem requiring massive industrial sites for plutonium production at
Hanford, Washington, and nearly all
the talent at Los Alamos to calculate
and form the sphere and the surrounding high explosives.
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Again, Groves made the call, and both
avenues were followed, at great cost,
until the TRINITY test at Alamogordo,
New Mexico, proved the plutonium
implosion, which was used in the “Fat
Man” bomb dropped on Nagasaki.
Since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, historians have devoted nearly as much energy
to debating who made the decision to
use the bomb as was released in the
atomic explosions. Norris goes into this
in some detail, looking specifically at
Groves’s role in decision making. He
concludes that, as is commonly the case
with large weapons development projects in wartime, the momentum of the
project drove the outcome. The bomb
was ready, an invasion of Japan looked
to be murderously costly, momentum
carried the day, and the bomb was
dropped on Japan.
Norris’s book is a fine complement to
Richard Rhodes’s The Making of the
Atomic Bomb (1986), in which Rhodes
covers the physics of the bomb. Both
books chronicle events that changed the
world.
FRANK C. MAHNCKE

Joint Warfare Analysis Center

Wright, Patrick. Tank: The Progress of a Monstrous War Machine. New York: Viking Penguin,
2002. 499pp. $29.95

The tank constitutes perhaps the most
readily identifiable symbol of land warfare. From its initial appearance during
World War I to the final stage of the
Gulf War, its considerable impact on
the outcome of some of last century’s
most significant wars is not in doubt.
Whether battles were fought on the
plains of Eastern Europe or in the deserts
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of the Middle East, the opponent that
made better use of the tank generally
emerged victorious. In the early
twenty-first century, the tank remains
the dominant instrument of land warfare. Indeed, the fact that the world’s
most powerful armies—including those
of the United States, Germany, Israel,
Russia, and China—continue to organize their ground forces around the
tank strongly suggests that its preeminent position is unlikely to be challenged any time soon.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the tank has
been the focus of a substantial amount
of literature. Most studies of the tank fit
into at least one of three basic categories: describing the tank’s actual part in
a particular war, analyzing its operational role in a particular army, or assessing the general theory behind
armored warfare. Studies that address
the tank’s past across time and space—
indeed, that go beyond the narrow confines of the battlefield itself—are rather
rare. This paucity of studies is apparently what spurred Patrick Wright, a
professor of modern cultural studies in
Great Britain, to produce this accessible, if flawed, history of the tank in the
twentieth century.
Wright adopts a chronological approach to his subject. He begins with
the first tentative use of the tank by the
British on the western front during the
First World War. He reasonably implies
that the tank had a certain shock value
on the battlefield but that it did not
contribute in any meaningful way to
Germany’s eventual defeat. The tank really came into its own during the interwar period. One of the best chapters in
this book traces the evolving military
philosophies of the major European armies during this era, especially the
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German and Russian preference for
maneuver warfare, with the tank as a
central component of the “combined
arms” team. World War II, he agrees,
demonstrated just how dominant the
tank could be on the mechanized battlefield, most astonishingly in the hands
of the Germans on both the Western
and Eastern Fronts and, later, in the
hands of the Soviets as they drove into
Central Europe.
The tank continued to be a “winning
weapon” in the postwar world too, as
Wright acknowledges in his discussion
of the Israeli experience with armored
warfare in the Arab-Israeli wars from
the 1956 Sinai campaign through the
1967 Six-Day War, to the 1973 Yom
Kippur War. Among the most stimulating material in the book is Wright’s description of Major General Israel Tal’s
philosophy of armored warfare, which
resulted in the design and construction
of the innovative Merkava tank. Tal, of
course, is the Jewish state’s most highly
regarded armored warfare specialist.
Wright also traces the tank’s part in the
Gulf War and muses about its potential
utility in an age of “digital” combat. All
in all, Wright manages to convey a
sense of the tank’s contribution to war
in the twentieth century.
Yet this book still suffers from a curiously unbalanced presentation. While it
is surely legitimate for the author to
write a history of the tank that goes beyond its successes and failures on the
battlefield—one that delves into the
tank’s broader cultural relevance—
Wright appears to have forgotten that
its primary influence has always been
on the battlefield itself. Thus, on the
one hand, undeniably major tank battles, like those that occurred at Kursk
during the Second World War and in
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the Sinai during the Yom Kippur War,
are examined in a cursory fashion. On
the other hand, undeniably minor episodes in the tank’s past, like the defacement of a memorial to Soviet troops in
postcommunist Czechoslovakia, are the
recipients of lavish coverage (relatively
speaking). Wright may favor cultural
over military affairs, but this sort of
bias should not serve as a license to
present a skewed picture of history.
Furthermore, the author writes from a
left-wing perspective, which he is honest enough to admit frankly. Such a
perspective is not inherently objectionable; however, when it leads to dubious
judgments about what to incorporate as
part of the tank’s history, it becomes a
problem. Thus he includes a long digression that probes in excruciating detail
J. F. C. Fuller’s bizarre Weltanschauung
and obnoxious racism. It would have
been sufficient for Wright simply to
mention in passing that, whatever
Fuller’s insights into armored warfare,
he was also an unsavory character with
extreme right-wing views. Likewise,
Wright spends the better part of a chapter examining a storage contraption for
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homeless people that bears only a superficial resemblance to a tank. This
specific detour seems intended to chide
the United States for its treatment of
the less fortunate rather than to illuminate the tank’s cultural relevance. A historical treatise, to put it bluntly, should
not be used as a vehicle for airing political views.
These criticisms should not be taken to
mean that Wright’s book is ultimately
unrewarding. To the contrary, it can be
consulted with profit by anyone who
has an interest in the tank. The book is,
after all, well written, well organized,
and filled with fascinating tidbits of information. However, it must be approached with a degree of caution. It is
not the judicious and dispassionate account that one would expect from a
professional observer but instead a polemic against a weapon and the ends to
which man has put it. The book should
be read with that notion firmly in
mind.
DAVID RODMAN

Dix Hills, New York

18

